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CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED RISK OF FRAUD: A MODEL FOR
PUBLICLY TRADED RESTAURANT COMPANIES
Elizabeth Yost and Robertico Croes
Rosen College of Hospitality Management, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
ABSTRACT. Many restaurant industry examples provide evidence that as a firm’s internal
control structure weakens and deficiencies are found, the opportunity for fraud increases
significantly. Thus, the central focus of this study is to understand the factors that contribute to
increased risk of fraud to determine which conditions promote an increased risk of fraud for
publicly traded restaurant companies. The main premise of the study tests the application of
the fraud triangle framework constructs to publicly traded restaurant companies during
the time period of 2002–2014, using proxy variables defined through literature. The proxy
variables selected were company size, amount of debt, employee turnover, organizational
structure, the Recession, inflation rate, interest rate, executive stock compensation, return on
assets, and international sales growth. The study used a probit model, using the incidence of a
reported internal control deficiency as the measurable dichotomous dependent variable.
INTRODUCTION
It is now known that millions of dollars were
misappropriated during the reign of corrupt and
deceptive business practices of corporations
during the early 2000s. Enron and WorldCom
caused publicly traded U.S. companies’ losses
upwards of US$7 trillion in market value as a
result of the corporate fraudulent reporting
scandals. The deceptive and corrupt business
practices of these companies andothers resulted
largely from a failure of corporate governance
and lack of ethical business practices, in which
internal control mechanisms were circum-
vented by conflicts of interest that enriched
executives and damaged shareholders (Free,
Stein, & Macintosh, 2007). Many academic
studies and industry examples provide evidence
that as a firm’s internal control structureweakens
and deficiencies are found, the opportunity
to engage in fraudulent financial reporting
increases significantly (Baker, 1998; Geller,
1991; Rezaee, 2005).
Further evidence of this problem notes that
publicly traded companies today are under
growing pressures from both passive and active
investors to constantly increase their stock value
in a competitive world where meeting per-
formance goals are necessary to maintain a
competitive edge (SEC, 2014). Because of these
pressures, the current business environment
may be one of increased susceptibility to fraud
and abuse (Martinek, 2005). To meet targets,
it is typical for companies to put additional
stresses on their internal control structures by
reducing head counts, requiring employees to
perform more than one job, and rearranging
risk profiles (Langevoort, 2006).
A weakened internal control structure is
more susceptible to an increase in internal
control deficiencies (COSO, 2000), which
increased for public companies after initial
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). In addition, as
companies make changes to their business
structures (e.g., get bigger or smaller from
acquisitions or dispositions) and enter into
complex accounting treatments and ventures,
opportunities for deficiencies increase (Bryan &
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Lilien, 2005). Deficiencies are often observed
through review of the main business cycles:
revenue and receivables, purchasing and
payables, treasury and stock, and financial
reporting (Vallens & Cook, 2001).
A deeper dive into this problem seeks to
understand whether there are specific indus-
tries that may be more susceptible than others
are to fraud and reported internal control
deficiencies. Some research has been con-
ducted in this area, and findings suggest that
companies in the telecommunications, tech-
nology, financial, and services industries
experience the most difficulty with Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance efforts because of increased
risk of fraud from industry and company risk
factors (AICPA, 2009). The restaurant industry, a
key player in the services industry, is particularly
subject to increased fraud risk because
executives and management control the key
sources of revenue through operations, credit
and market assessment (Boulton, 2013). For
example, if executives and management have a
business plan that promotes aggressive financial
reporting, then fraud risk is increased.
In addition, the restaurant industry comprises
companies that operate as cash businesses with
a large volume of transactions, are heavily
dependent on supplier partner relationships,
are incredibly competitive, and are sensitive
to changes in macroeconomic conditions
(Bernardi & Pincus, 1996). Each of these
characteristics provides opportunities for
increased fraud risk through related variables,
which will be discussed subsequently in the
literature review. In other words, the restaurant
industry is often susceptible to deficiencies
because of its inherent characteristics and high
control risk (Rezaee, 2005). Examining the
industry risk factors that may lead to fraud in the
restaurant industry, specifically, through the
occurrence of control deficiencies is a mean-
ingful research problem.
Corporate scandals, misappropriation of
assets and financial statement misstatement are
all very real threats to the restaurant industry.
According to the National Restaurant Associ-
ation (NRA), fraud conditions amount to
approximately 4% of industry sales, which is
anywhere from $23 to $26 billion dollars
(Garber & Walkup, 2004). Internal controls are
often the first avenue of protection in safe-
guarding assets and thwarting and discovering
errors and fraud (Arad & Jamshedy-Navid,
2010); however, if fraud is going to occur,
research has shown that motivation and
rationalization are key factors that contribute
to fraud (Krippel, Henderson, Keene, Levi, &
Converse, 2008). Therefore, pressure resulting
from expectations of financial performance,
opportunity to circumvent internal controls,
and rationalization coupled with certain
inherent industry factors may contribute to
increased risk of fraud (Fikes, 2009).
Given that the restaurant industry is
susceptible to increased fraud risk because its
inherent general industry characteristics pro-
vide opportunities for unethical behavior and
fraud, further examination and assessment of
these characteristics is also warranted.
As noted, opportunity to engage in unethical
behavior may stem from the macro environ-
ment, the operational features, and the specific
nature of the business cycles (Allen, 2008) in
the restaurant industry. Thus, on the basis of
both the general industry and operating
characteristics and factors, the restaurant
industry appears to be susceptible to increased
risk of fraud. Because of this potential for fraud
on the company, shareholders, and the public,
examining the conditions that may prompt
fraud is necessary for the efficiency of the
restaurant industry, and namely, for those
passive and active investors that are relying on
the financial statements to be true and accurate
(Kincaid, 2002; Rezaee, 2005). Ultimately, faith
in an investment is what all investors seek,
and history has shown that fraud can have a
significant effect on financial investments.
Quality of life and the standard of living are
natural outcomes and goals of financial
investments, and severe cases of fraud can
derail both (Kincaid, 2002).
Therefore, the central focus of this study
is to understand the factors that contribute to
increased risk of fraud to determine why fraud
may occur despite the imposed regulation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The main premise of
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the study tests the application of the fraud
triangle framework constructs to publicly traded
restaurant companies during the time period
of 2002–2014, using proxy variables defined
through literature. In essence, the study seeks to
identify the factors that may provide the
optimal criteria to engage in fraudulent or
opportunistic behavior, using the incidence of a
reported control deficiency as the measurable
dependent variable.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION/REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE
An explanation for why fraud occurs is
embedded in the framework known as the
“fraud triangle.” The fraud triangle is the model
that explains the factors that may cause an
individual or a company to commit occu-
pational fraud. The framework was first
proposed by Dr. Donald Cressey (1950) and
consists of three constructs: pressure/motiv-
ation, opportunity, and rationalization. The
three constructs offer an explanation as to why
management commits fraud, and the dynamic
relationship that underlies the acts of occu-
pational fraud.
FRAUD TRIANGLE CONSTRUCT—
PRESSURE/MOTIVATION
On the basis of an understanding and
synthesis of literature presented as well as a
review of SAS 99, it seems that pressure may
best be classified into four general types that
may lead to fraud: financial stability, external
pressure, manager’s personal financial situ-
ations, and meeting financial targets (Skousen,
Smith, & Wright, 2009). Financial stability
refers to the pressure that managers face
when financial stability and/or profitability are
threatened by industry, economic, and com-
pany operating environments. External press-
ure refers largely to meeting external financing
needs or obtaining financing needs in order to
remain competitive. Supporting this pressure
category, Efendi et al. (2007) found that
intentional errors and misstatements are more
probable for companies controlled by debt
covenants, companies that issue new or debt
equity capital, or companies that have a chief
executive officer that also functions as the
Chairman of the Board. For example, numerous
researchers have found indication that execu-
tive stock option compensation provides
encouragements for behavior that is fraudulent
or corrupt (Burns & Kedia, 2006; Lie, 2005;
Summers & Sweeney, 1998). This is because
stock options drive up the share price and
provide additional incentives for insider
trading, a significant problem noted by Glass
Lewis & Co (2006). Because personal financial
problems depend on company financial
performance, this fraud pressure becomes
stronger. Last, meeting financial targets is
evident as a pressure as manager’s performance
is often tied to bonus payouts and salary
increases (Summers & Sweeney, 1998).
The differing classifications and definitions
of pressure provide evidence that the construct
is not directly observable; therefore, research-
ers in this field have measured the construct
of pressure through proxy variables (Skousen
et al., 2009). For example, Lister (2007) and
Skousen et al. (2009) measured personal,
employment, and external pressure through
proxies of rapid asset growth, increased need
for cash, and the presence of debt financing.
However, Persons (1995) found that the most
substantial variables indicative of fraud were
leverage, asset composition, and company size.
Expounding on Persons’ (1995) findings and
relating these to the categories of pressures per
SAS 99, proxies developed for financial stability
included gross profit margin, sales and asset
growth (Beasley, 2000; Beneish, 1997), which
are often used as measures of company size.
In addition, when considering measurements of
external pressures relating to debt financing,
the financial leverage ratio is the most common
measurement of the amount of debt. When
considering pressure relating to personal
financial need, Dunn (2004) provided evidence
relating executive stock ownership to their
personal financial situations. If stock ownership
is significant, personal finances are threatened.
Therefore, a proxy for personal financial need
is often defined in terms of ownership, or the
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percentage of shares owned by management
out of the total shares outstanding. Last, return
on total assets (ROA) is a measure of operating
performance widely used to indicate how
efficiently assets have been used. ROA is
frequently used as an assessment of managers’
performance and in determining bonuses.
Therefore, ROA, or asset composition, is an
appropriate proxy measurement for the press-
ure of meeting financial targets.
Regardless of the interpretations of pressure
provided in literature, it is interesting to note
that the conclusions about nonshareable
problems and the way that they are resolved
seems to relate specifically to individuals, and
assumes that such individuals become trust
violators in an organization when confronted
with the pressures described. However, non-
shareable problems could also motivate groups
of individuals, representative of a company’s
culture, to commit fraud. For example, Lister
(2007) indicated that external pressures such
as intense competition or not meeting analyst’s
expectations may induce fraud committed by
groups of individuals. Likewise, the aforemen-
tioned four main categories of pressure defined
relate to both the individual and group of
individuals in a company.
When examining some of these specific
pressures through the lens of the restaurant
industry, it is imperative to note that the industry
as a whole underperformed during the
Recession, making it susceptible to poor
performance and increased pressure to meet
analysts’ expectations (Rosner, 2003). In a study
of Swedish restaurant companies, it is noted
that competition is very high, often resulting
in price wars among different companies that
reduce prices and then try to compensate
through increased sales (Alalehto, 2000). This
environment is therefore dependent on the
discretionary income of consumers, and this
increased pressure may lead to earnings
mismanagement through overstatement.
In addition, restaurant companies are often
ladled with heavy debt covenants as a result of
construction and development loans as they
build up locations (Sidel, 2007). Last, publicly
traded restaurant companies heavily depend on
investors who often offer discounted stock
options to employees to promote increases in
share price. As information about acquisitions
and divestitures are revealed, insider trading
may become a pressure and motivator for fraud
(Hogan & Wilkins 2008).
Both pressures and opportunities are often
determined by factors that occur at both the
individual and company level (Carcello et al.,
2006). However, without pressures that
provide a motivation for fraud, opportunities
to engage in fraud cease to become an issue.
Therefore, according to the fraud triangle, it can
be said that opportunity does not exist unless
a pressure exists. The next section discusses
the second construct of the fraud triangle:
opportunity.
FRAUD TRIANGLE CONSTRUCT:
OPPORTUNITY
Opportunity is described as an atmosphere
or temporary environment that enables fraud
to be committed, usually with a small perceived
probability of being caught or reprimanded
(Cressey, 1973; Jensen, 1993). Openings for
opportunity exist for misconduct when firms
have weak internal controls, a lack of policies
and/or procedures, unauthorized or unsuper-
vised access to assets (lack of segregation of
duties), or a deficiency of management over-
sight and review (Bratton, 2002; Young, 2005).
SAS 99 further confirms that the opportunity for
fraud increases when certain risk factors exist
for a company. Some risk factors include the
susceptibility of the industry to market changes
as well as the nature of the industry, coupled
with the specific operations of the company
such as whether there are significant or
complex international operations; how effec-
tive management is at monitoring activities
within the organization; and the level of
complexity that exists in the organization
(Albrecht et al., 2004).
The three aforementioned categories are
measured by a certain proxy variable that has
been defined in literature. For example,
Summers and Sweeney (1998) and Albrecht
(2002) noted that when a firm has a large
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amount of international operations, the oppor-
tunity for fraud increases. The percentage of
international sales is an appropriate measure of
this opportunity, calculated by total inter-
national sales divided by total sales.
Unsound and intricate organizational struc-
tures may be demonstrated by increased
turnover of executive management, board of
directors, or legal counsel members. This is
often measured by calculating the number of
executives who left the company in the years
before the fraud incidence. In addition, strong
evidence has also linked the CEO position to
fraud when the CEO is also the Chairman of the
Board. In incidences like this, the CEO is the
dominate decision maker for an organization
that may provide an increased opportunity for
fraud. Beasley (1996) noted that the longer the
CEO holds the position of power, the greater
the likelihood that he or she would be able to
control the decisions of the board of directors.
The underlying reason for these three
categories of increased opportunities for fraud
is the state of the internal controls structure, and
management’s commitment to strong corporate
governance (Abbott et al., 2004). This is because
corporate governance and internal controls set
ethical expectations for employees. Loebbecke
and Willingham (1988) surveyed audit firms
that have had knowledge of incidences of
financial statement fraud and found that weak
internal controls and dominated management
decisions that override internal controls are the
leading circumstances that increase the prob-
ability of fraud occurrence. Weak corporate
governance structures are often presented
through ineffective monitoring of management.
For example, Dechow et al. (1996) found that
companies that manipulate performance are
more probable to have a structure in which the
CEO is also the Chairman of the Board as well as
the founder of the company. Similarly, Farber
(2005) found that companies who committed
fraud had fewer financial experts on the board,
fewer independent members, and a larger
percentage of CEOs who hold the title of
Chairman of the Board. This further contributes
to the existing academic research that a weak
corporate governance structure provides the
greatest opportunity for fraud and supports the
categories supported by SAS 99.
Public companies in the restaurant industry
are susceptible to opportunities for fraud on the
basis of the aforementioned opportunities. The
nature of the industry is a cash business, making
the business more susceptible to fraud, and
opportunities arise from a lack of internal
controls. The ability to commit fraud in the
restaurant industry results from inside knowl-
edge of processes and procedures, and the
ability to circumvent controls through weak-
nesses (Whitfield, 2013). In addition, corporate
governance structures in the restaurant industry
vary according to the sophistication of the
organization and the attitudes of seniormanage-
ment. Thus, the attitudes or rationalizations are
shaped where there are pressures and opportu-
nities to commit fraud. The next section
discusses the third construct in more detail.
FRAUD TRIANGLE CONSTRUCT:
RATIONALIZATION
Rationalization is the third construct of the
fraud triangle and is the most difficult to
measure. Rationalization is essentially an
attitude, belief, or position of the mind or
ethical personality that enables an employee or
group of employees of a company to intention-
ally misappropriate assets and then defend their
dishonest activities (Cressey, 1973). Measuring
rationalization is difficult; however, it has been
done within the audit literature by defining
it through the frameworks of borrowing and
entitlement. A quantifiable means of capturing
this could be through review of executive stock
compensationmeasures. Often, an incidence of
audit failure through reported internal control
deficiencies is tied to executive stock compen-
sation measures, indicating that fraud is more
likely for companies that have high amounts of
compensation for executives. In addition, Verm-
eer (2003) noted that management may often
rationalize financial reporting methods through
the creation and use of accrual entries. There-
fore, excessive use of discretionary accruals
may lead to poor audit opinions, providing a
rationalized thought for business activities.
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However, because it is difficult to ascertain
root causes of accrual entries, this is not an
appropriate measure of rationalization for
determining increased risk of fraud. Manage-
ment may or may not have a stake in reporting
issues andmost of the time the entries are made
in response to uncontrollable business activities
(Gray & Vogel, 2002).
Defining parameters for financial reporting
can also have an effect on reducing the
rationalized behavior and the opportunity to
commit fraud (Hogan &Wilkins 2008). Nelson,
Elliot, and Tarpley (2002) determined that the
specifics of current standards of accounting
deterred the rationalization of managers’
attempt to manage earnings. In addition, Gillett
and Uddin (2005) found that the approach of
the CFO toward financial reporting was a chief
effect on an objective to misrepresent infor-
mation. For restaurant companies, this means
that rationalizations and attitudes can be
managed by assessing the internal control
environment and understanding the pressures
and opportunities that exist for employees.
It is important to note that the elements of
the fraud triangle have not been considered
or applied comprehensively to the restaurant
industry. As previously reviewed, some
researchers have looked to the fraud triangle
as a means to define certain pressures,
opportunities, and rationalizations generally to
corporate businesses, but not to hospitality
businesses separately (Baker, 1998). The value
in the application of the fraud triangle to the
restaurant industry provides an opportunity to
extend theoretical contributions that originated
from mainstream accounting to hospitality
literature, which is severely lacking in the
current literature (Zimmerman, 2003).
The next section discusses industry charac-
teristics and company variables that best
explain pressures, opportunities, and rational-
izations in the restaurant industry.
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND
INCREASED FRAUD RISK
On the basis of the previous discussion, past
literature reveals general measurable variables
that may contribute to increased fraud risk.
In the context of specific industries, it is noted
that many characteristics of the restaurant
industry reveal similar variables found within
the fraud triangle as described in the account-
ing and audit literature. For example, the
nature of the restaurant industry is often
described as a periodic, seasonal, and cyclic
trade (Chathoth & Olsen, 2007; Choi, 2007;
Parsa, Self, Njite, & King 2005), often
susceptible to changes in political, social, and
economic conditions, including inflation,
unemployment, and rising interest rates.
These conditions are related to the financial
stability variables often found within the
pressure construct of the fraud triangle.
Because these conditions have an obvious
effect on earnings and measures of success, this
seasonal variability and volatility should be
considered when analyzing pressures in the
restaurant industry (Yap, 2008). In addition, the
stringent requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in 2002 created reporting and monitoring
of internal controls for the first time, resulting in
increased amounts of reported internal control
deficiencies (Ge & McVay, 2005).
Restaurants may respond negatively to the
political, social, and economic pressures as
evidenced by poor performance in profitability
or growth and measured by changes in gross
profit margin or asset size. Some restaurant
industry pressures that may impact profitable
sales growth include a lack of understanding of
the consumer’s perception, including the
relevance of existing brands, and delays in
opening new restaurants. Likewise, an inability
to consider cost pressures, including increasing
fees for supplies, utilities, and health care
providers contracted by restaurants, as well as
an incapability of obtaining economies of scale
in procurement, could compress margins and
negatively impact sales and operations profit
margin. Supporting these pressures, Ge and
McVay (2005) discovered that firms with
deficiencies in internal control are more
multifarious, smaller and less gainful than
those firms that have not disclosed deficiencies.
On the basis of these findings, it can be stated
that publicly traded restaurant companies with
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diminished earnings (as measured by gross
profit margin) over time are at an increased risk
of fraud due to pressures resulting from
financial instability inherent in the industry.
Likewise, restaurant companies that are smaller
(and therefore may not have strong internal
controls) with increasingly complex transactions
create additional opportunities for fraud to be
committed (Levisohn, 2009).
When considering additional external
pressures, it is clear that the success of publicly
traded restaurant companies depends on their
ability to obtain debt financing to grow, as well
as the capability to pay down liabilities, manage
debt, and obtain financing for future acquire-
ments (Advani, 2006). It is also noted that the
world credit markets and the financial industry
has experienced unparalleled mayhem, often
described as obligatory insolvency, which has
necessitated various levels of governmental
intervention. These events can negatively affect
the obtainability of credit already established,
as well as the accessibility and the future cost of
credit. Therefore, when debt financing exists, in
order to address past and future obligations,
and remain competitive, restaurant companies
are at an increased risk of fraud especially when
disruptions in financial and credit markets exist.
Studies have revealed that restaurant
company victory and demise is eventually
correlated to restaurant leadership abilities and
intentions; therefore, it can be stated that
executives and managers’ intentions are of
utmost concern in understanding risk of fraud
(Parsa et al., 2005). In addition, ineffective
management may be connected to disappoint-
ing financial conditions, insufficient cash use
and inadequacy in operations. When con-
ditions that relate to a poor financial situation
exist and are coupled with perceived opportu-
nity and rationalization, the propensity for
fraud increases greatly. For example, the
pressure to manipulate earnings through stock
ownership may occur when manager and
executive salaries are tied to bonus potential.
Insider trading and knowledge of proposed
transactions may enable a manager to act in an
unethical manner by selling or buying up
additional shares of discounted stock (Burns &
Kedia, 2006; Lie, 2005; Summers & Sweeney,
1998). A significant fluctuation in shares
available may provide evidence of concern.
In addition, feelings of failure may also motivate
executives and managers to commit fraud.
Researchers Haswell and Holmes (1989)
conveyed that insufficient management, inep-
titude, and greenness are constant themes in
elucidating restaurant failures, coupled with a
bad product, weak organizational culture, and
poor marketing choices (Camillo et al., 2008).
The pressure of failure may be too great for one
to handle, leaving no other perceived option
but to commit a fraudulent act.
It is also noted that the restaurant industry is
extremely competitive with respect to pricing,
level of service, locality, workforce, type/quality
of food, with a plethora of well-established
competitors. Growing competition in the
industry is noted from a convergence of store,
deli, and restaurant services, particularly in
supermarkets that now offer “meals of conven-
ience.” Echoing Lister (2007), competitiveness
is a condition that makes meeting financial
targets difficult and provides opportunity for
fraudulent behavior. External pressure from
analysts and investors may create an incentive
to misappropriate assets, which, in turn, distorts
common financial measures of success such as
return on assets. Given that assets are balance
sheet items carried year over year, a significant
fluctuation over a relatively short amount of
time could provide an indication of increased
fraud risk (Ge & McVay, 2005).
It has been noted that the nature of the
industry is a key opportunity that may result in
an increased fraud risk. Doyle et al. (2007)
demonstrated that industries made up of
companies that are younger, undergoing capital
restructuring, or growing rapidly are at an
increased likelihoodof reporting internal control
deficiencies. Likewise, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
(2006) discovered that firms with increasingly
complex operations coupled with changes in
organizational structure have less resources to
put into internal controls and are therefore at an
increased risk for accounting errors. The
restaurant industry often comprises companies
that are younger and undergoing restructuring,
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while attempting to grow through both domestic
and international franchisee partners. While a
collective exercise in the restaurant industry is to
generate sales and profit through international
franchisee relationships, there is no guarantee
that international operations will be gainful or
that international growth will be continually
successful. International growth is subject to risks
such as international political and economic
conditions, foreign currency fluctuations, and
divergent cultures and consumer inclinations
(Kim & Gu, 2006). As noted then, a large
percentage of international sales could result in
increased fraud opportunities.
In addition to these industry characteristics,
it has been noted that the restaurant industry is
one of high employee turnover (Allen, 2008) as
a result of workforce diversity and the presence
of many perceived low-skilled workers.
In addition, as companies within the industry
respond to declining performance, publicly
traded restaurant companies may be subject to
activist investors who wish to see a change in
the executive management team. If a shake-up
such as this would occur, the organizational
structure of the company may become
unstable, resulting in much greater opportu-
nities for fraud to occur at all levels. As noted by
Beasley (1996), further fraud incidences may
occur if the CEO is also the Chairman of the
Board, as this creates an opportunity for one
person to control the tone of the company.
These opportunities in the industry may be
measured by benchmarking the turnover rate
for each company and determining whether
the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board.
Variables relating to rationalization are
present in the restaurant industry when
considering the motivations and attitudes of
management. It is noted that in difficult times,
such as the Recession, aggressive financial
reporting tactics may be used (Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2006). Ultimately, the management team
is responsible for the establishment and
maintenance of financial reporting controls
and reporting. As stated, when pressure and
opportunities exist, rationalization becomes the
final needed component for an increased risk of
fraud to occur. Aggressive financial reporting
tactics may be observed through executive
compensation levels that are higher than
average, and possibly through evidence of a
change in auditor before the 5-year mandatory
turnover (Ge & McVay, 2005).
It is noted from the aforementioned
discussion that many internal and external
variables provide measurements to the con-
structs of pressure, opportunity, and rationaliz-
ation, which, when all present, increase the risk
of occupational fraud. This study will focus on
the variables most pertinent to the restaurant
industry on the basis of the inherent character-
istics of U.S. publicly traded restaurant
companies, as previously described in this
section. These variables have been explained
and identified as company size, amount of
debt, employee turnover, organizational struc-
ture, the Recession, inflation rate, interest rate,
executive stock compensation, ROA, and
international sales growth.
In addition, this study looks to assess the
relation between the amount of debt a
company has occurred and the incidence of
reported internal control deficiencies. Empirical
research notes that high amounts of debt create
external pressures, thereby increasing the risk
of fraud. In addition to debt financing, most
publicly traded restaurant companies raise
capital through equity financing and company
stock programs. Restaurant companies are no
exception, and frequently provide opportu-
nities for management to buy up stock at a
discounted price (Allen, 2008). Therefore, the
presence of substantial stock compensation
may provide incentives and rationalization for
management to commit fraud, especially in
periods of rough financial times. Thus, this
study seeks to understand the effect of
substantial stock compensation on increased
fraud risk.
In addition, ROA may provide indicators of
a company’s ability to meet financial targets.
Therefore, this study also hypothesizes that
poor ROA could increase the risk of fraud, as
the pressure provides executive management
with the motivation to manipulate earnings.
Also, as most restaurant companies are
expanding internationally, the percentage of
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international sales may increase fraud risk as a
result of lack of control over foreign operations
or the ability to circumvent controls in attempts
to promote the strategy as a successful
operation. In addition, this study suggests that
the organizational structure of the company
may provide opportunity for increased fraud
risk through a unitary tone at the top. Last,
incidences of employee turnover in addition to
macroeconomic factors and the Great Reces-
sion may all provide additional increased fraud
risk for publicly traded restaurant companies.
Each of the aforementioned variables provides
a model that pertains to the central research
problem and were selected on the basis of a
review of the literature.
On the basis of the presented literature
review, this study analysed the disclosures of
publicly traded restaurant companies to
determine whether a company has a higher
probability of increased fraud risk on the basis
of the presented variables.
RESEARCH METHOD
The research study adopted an exploratory
research design using the case of publicly
traded U.S. restaurant companies to provide a
better understanding of the characteristics that
may contribute to increased fraud risk.
This study intended to estimate the
probability of increased risk of fraud as a result
of deficiencies reported for publicly reported
restaurant companies and controlling for
specific industry and company characteristics
or factors. The data comprise yearly time series
data from 2004 to 2013, or a period of 10 years
for 40 companies, across 12 variables, provid-
ing a complete data set of 4,800 data points.
The dataset is therefore considered to be panel,
also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional
time series, and thus accounts for the individual
heterogeneity of 40 publicly traded U.S.
restaurant companies. As a panel data set, the
data are strongly balanced, which means that
each panel contains the same time points
(Hamilton, 2012).
The description of each variable is sum-
marized in Table 1. Per review of Table 1, it is
noted that the majority of the variables are
continuous in nature and are ratios. Company
size is also continuous, but this variable is in
millions of dollars instead of a percent. For
purposes of analysis, this variable will be
transformed to its logged function to ensure
that the data meet the assumptions of the
statistical tests of the probit model. Company
size varies as a result of different company
market capitalizations, and taking the logarith-
mic values will reduce wide-ranging quantities
to smaller scopes, enabling better understand-
ing of the data patterns (Oswald, 1997).
The other independent variables, recession
and organizational structure, are categorical
TABLE 1. Description of Variables
Variable Symbol Range Value
Deficiency DE 0–1 0 ¼ no deficiency noted
1 ¼ deficiency noted
Company size SZ 0–$344 billion Continuous
Amount of debt DEBT 0–100% Continuous
Employee turnover ET 0–100% Continuous
Inflation rate IR 0–100% Continuous
Unemployment rate UR 0–100% Continuous
Interest rate IRT 0–100% Continuous
Recession years R 0–1 0 ¼ not a recession year;
1 ¼ recession year
Organizational structure ORG 0–1 0 ¼ CEO is not Chairman of the Board
1 ¼ CEO is Chairman of the Board
International sales growth INT 0–100% Continuous
Stock Comp. STOCK 0–100% Continuous
Return on Assets ROA 0–100% Continuous
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dummy variables and are coded as 0 or 1.
As defined in the literature following the
National Bureau of Economic Research,
recession years of 2007–2009 are coded
as 1, with the rest of the years coded as 0.
Organizational structure is coded as 0 if the
CEO is not also the Chairman of the Board,
and 1 if the CEO is Chairman of the Board.
Last, the inflation rate, interest rate, and
unemployment rate are continuous variables
and are provided at the current rates for each
year in the time series.
The study assumed a binary distribution of
the dependent variable, increased fraud risk,
measured by the incidence of a reported
internal control deficiency over the testable
time period. This study complements Beneish’s
methodological format for publicly traded
restaurant companies and proposes a similar
probit model to test the impact of the financial
and nonfinancial variables on the incidence of
reporting internal control deficiencies for
publicly traded restaurant companies. Probit
refers to “probability unit” and is an additional
term that refers to the Z-score of a normal
distribution. The probit model assumes that the
probability of manipulation, or increased fraud
risk, remains small at first, but then surges
quickly, leveling off as the variables dip into a
territory of red flags. This generates a sigmoidal
or S-shaped line that is be represented by the
aggregate normal (Tellis, 1986). Thus, for this
study, the probit model estimates likelihood by
regressing the binary dependent variable to the
independent variables to determine character-
istics which highlight increased fraud risk.
Specifically, the study used this probit model
to estimate the probability that an entity or
company will be at an increased risk of fraud
on the basis of the independent variables that
support and are linked to the fraud triangle
framework, as presented in the literature
review. The study uses the probit model to
estimate the relation between the independent
variables and the dichotomous dependent
variable (whether an internal control deficiency
was reported in a given year).
This study proposes that the variables are
created from the company’s financials and
external factors according to the model to
produce an M score to define the gradation in
which the increased fraud risk may occur. The
M score will be based on a combination of the
11 variables and weighted together according
to the following formula:
Prob FðYÞ ¼ FðXb1þ . . . :Xb11þ 1Þ ð1Þ
It is important to note that for the research
problem at hand, the use of a probit model is
necessary because of the assumption that there
are latent variables that occur as part of the
function. In a linear regression, Y would be
observed directly. However, as noted, probits
only show observations of 0 or 1, in this case,
whether there is an increased risk of fraud.
A probit model allows for the calculated
likelihood of each Y through any given set of
b coefficients, and the likelihood estimation
determines the bs to maximize the likelihood of
the given sample. The estimation step involves
taking the logs of the sample likelihoods and
solve for the probability.
Knowledge of the fundamentals of probit
modeling, in conjunction with understanding
Beneish’s assumptions, can assist analysts and
executive managers in obtaining value for the
restaurant industry, where the ability to forecast
increased fraud risk ahead of the curve means
the difference between profit and hefty fines
or reputational losses. In addition, it is noted
that much of finance and accounting research
includes binary variables (i.e., the buy/sell
decision is binary), so it is shocking that probit
is not more extensively used. There are only a
few examples of the use of the model in this
area of research. For example, the Beneish
method was used by students to predict
manipulation of Enron’s financials 1 year before
Enron’s bankruptcy.
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES IN THE
EQUATION
On the basis of the aforementioned
description of the research design, the following
panel model is proposed to test the research
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hypotheses:
PðReportedDeficiency ¼ 1jXÞ
¼ Probit b0 þ
X11
n¼1
bnxn þ et
 !
ð2Þ
where P(Reported Deficiency ¼ 1jX) ¼ the
probability of a reported deficiency in the
annual report given X; X ¼ a vector of all
independent variables; Probit is used to
symbolize the probit function form; and
reported deficiency ¼ 1 when a restaurant
company has reported an internal control
deficiency according to SOX requirements
listed in the annual report for a given year.
. x1 ¼ company size ¼ individual compa-
nies’ gross profit margin – the industry
median profit margin, with the gross profit
margin calculated as (total sales – cost of
goods sold) divided by total sales
. x2 ¼ debt leverage ¼ Individual compa-
nies’ financial leverage ratio – the industry
median leverage ratio for each year
studied, with financial leverage ratio
calculated as average total debt divided
by average total equity.
. x3 ¼ employee turnover ¼ Individual
companies’ turnover – the industry
median turnover for each year studied,
with turnover calculated as the average
separations during the year divided by the
total number of employees
. x4 ¼ inflation rate ¼ current market rates
for each year studied
. x5 ¼ unemployment rate ¼ current mar-
ket rates for each year studied
. x6 ¼ interest rate ¼ current market rates
for each year studied
. x7 ¼ recession year ¼ 1 when the year of
study is either 2007, 2008, or 2009
. x8 ¼ organizational structure ¼ 1 when
the individual company has a CEO who
is also the Chairman of the Board, for each
year studied.
. x9 ¼ international sales growth ¼ Individ-
ual companies’ international sales growth
rate – the industry median international
sales growth rate for each year studied,
with international sales rate calculated as
average international sales divided by total
sales.
. x10 ¼ executive stock compensation ¼
Individual companies’ performance
based stock compensation – the industry
median stock compensation for each year
studied, with stock compensation bench-
marked to performance sensitivity
measures.
. x11 ¼ ROA ¼ Individual companies’ ROA
– the industry median ROA for each year
studied, with ROA calculated as average
net income divided by total assets.
Each of these presented variables have been
tested in past studies and are linked to common
red flags of fraud; however, it is noted that none
of these variables have ever been applied in
a comprehensive fashion to the restaurant
industry. Therefore, this model represents a
major contribution to existing hospitality
literature because it bridges mainstream audit
and accounting theories to the restaurant
industry. Whereas most research papers have
looked to establish predictive measures for
success for restaurant companies, there have
been virtually no studies that have looked at
characteristics of increased risk of fraud.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
After satisfying the assumptions and unit
root tests, the overall final probit model is
significant at p , .05; with a chi-square value
of .0501. The chi-square value is used in
analysis instead of the F statistic because of the
previously determined selection of a random
effects model (Baltagi, 2008). In addition, the
model provides the intraclass correlation, rho,
which indicates the percentage of variance that
is due to differences across panels (companies).
This value is .530191, which indicates that
more than half of the variance (53%) is due
to differences across (or between) panels
(companies). This variance provides support
for a future separation of the data into
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subsegments according to type of restaurant
company (e.g., fast casual, fine dining;
Chathoth & Olsen, 2007).
LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED FRAUD
RISK
As noted in the overall model, the results
reveal that the model as a whole is a significant
fit to the data. Although the company-level
variables were not significant in the overall
model, external factors were each significant.
Specifically, the recession, interest rate,
inflation rate, and unemployment rate all appear
to have a significant effect on the increased risk
of fraud as evidenced by an incidence of a
reported internal control deficiency. It can be
said that there is a significant relation between
increased risk of fraud and the macroeconomic
factors of interest, inflation, and unemployment
rates. Using an application of marginal effects,
it can be said that each additional change in
interest rates yields an increase of about 29% in
the likelihood of increased risk of fraud through a
reported control deficiency. Likewise, it can be
said that each additional change in inflation
rates yields an increase of about 22.5% in the
likelihood of increased risk of fraud through a
reported control deficiency. Last, applying
marginal effects, it can be said that each
additional change in unemployment rates yields
an increase of about 6.4% in the likelihood of
increased risk of fraud through a reported control
deficiency.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the applied probit model
reveal for the entire population set of publicly
traded restaurant companies that the macro-
economic factors of the Recession, interest
rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate all
have a significant impact on the increased risk
of fraud, as evidenced through a reported
internal control deficiency. These factors all
impact demand by consumers for all types of
restaurants, and are often noted as risk factors
in management’s discussion and analysis
(FASAB, 1999). Therefore, it can be said that
the results of this study empirically support
the intuition that changes in macroeconomic
conditions may impact increased risk of fraud
for companies in the restaurant industry. From
a practical standpoint, these results may
support the position that management may
not have control over factors like macroeco-
nomic conditions that, in turn, may increase
the likelihood of fraud (Wang, 2012). The
likelihood of increased risk of fraud is
evidenced through the mathematical function
that applies the probability values from the
results of the model. Under these parameters,
the probability of increased fraud risk ranges
from 43 to 68%, depending on the macro-
economic variable, for the overall population
of restaurant companies.
These results imply a couple of theoretical
notions: first, that the fraud triangle is
contextual when applied to the restaurant
industry because only the variables that are
TABLE 2. Final Probit Model (Form and Identified Lags Included)
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z score p
D. Company size (natural log) 0.0480868 .0668365 0.72 .472
D. Debt –0.3937673 .3058717 –1.29 .198
D. Employee turnover –1.706809 1.18543 –1.44 .150
Recession 0.7711787 2540667 3.04 .002*
D. International sales growth 0.0287585 1.130567 0.03 .980
D. Stock compensation –0.0179812 .1873975 0.10 .924
D. Return on assets 1.211963 1.706828 0.71 .478
D. Interest rate 0.768265 21.67142 3.55 .000*
D. Inflation rate –0.190374 9.441415 –2.11 .035*
D. Unemployment rate 0.25997 7.193341 3.61 .000*
Organizational structure –.01462004 .1723243 –0.85 .396
*Significant at p , .05 level.
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outside of managements control were signifi-
cant. In addition, from a managerial perspec-
tive, the study provides evidence that
macroeconomic conditions that might affect
consumer demand may increase the risk of
fraud for publicly traded restaurant companies.
The contribution of this study therefore
supports part of Cressey’s general framework
as well as the AICPA’s use of the fraud triangle to
identify fraud red flags. Last, this study
contributes to the effectiveness of the fraud
triangle framework by supporting the frame-
work through the identification of conditions
that may lead to reported deficiencies. Future
research could provide insight regarding why
certain types of restaurants are more suscep-
tible to various internal variables.
The main practical, managerial contri-
bution of this study highlights the risk factors
that the executive management of publicly
traded restaurant companies should focus on
in order to mitigate increased risk of fraud.
First, from a practical standpoint, the effects of
a Recession and fluctuating interest, inflation,
and unemployment rates study contribute to
the current body of literature regarding fraud
and the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on deterring fraud risk. By focusing on the
changing macroeconomic conditions that
may have an empirical effect on demand,
executive leadership will be able to streamline
processes to avoid incidences of reporting
internal control deficiencies when exposed to
the macroeconomic conditions. For example,
revenue recognition processes should be
scrutinized as a Recessionary time period is
realized for the restaurant industry. This will
ease the burden of reporting on internal
controls and allow managers to focus on the
most meaningful processes in order to reduce
noted deficiencies.
The importance of this contribution is
evident, when considering that the cost of
complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure
requirements is tremendous. Compliance with
section 404 is arguably one of the most
controversial areas of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
largely due to the opinions that the costs of
compliance far outweigh the benefits. For
example, a study in 2005 estimated that
Fortune 1000 firms expended an average of
$5.9 million to comply with the internal control
reporting requirements in their first year of
compliance with section 404 of the Act
(DeFranco & Lattin, 2006; Gupta & Nayar,
2006; Hammersley et al., 2008). Given the
high costs of compliance, it is necessary to have
a road map that will provide managers with the
suggestion to focus on internal controls when
faced with declining conditions as a result of
changing macroeconomic conditions.
In addition to the high costs of compliance,
it is also important to recognize additional
managerial characteristics that may heighten
the effects of the macroeconomic conditions
on increased fraud risk. For example, it is well
known in organizational behavior research that
structure and processes shape how executive
management is making sense of what is
happening around them (Rubin, 1996). Never
is this more important or evident than in times
when the economy is in a Recession.
As indicated by the results of the study,
however, many times executive management
does not recognize the problems associated
with the macroeconomic conditions because of
systematic perceptual filters that play the crucial
role in the functioning of the company. For
example, executive management only has
available a certain amount of information to
make decisions, and that information is often
decentralized and therefore poses a challenge
to coherent corporate decision making (Arrow,
1974). In the restaurant industry in particular,
information is also not readily quantifiable,
which makes it even more difficult to transform
into meaningful and timely information for
executive management. Particular examples
include consumer insights and how well new
promotions are received and moved through-
out the market.
All of these managerial characteristics
create a situation where management is not
fully conscious of their bias towards optimism,
which may also be shaped by corporate culture
and the strong desire to appear to be in control
of all areas of the business (Bainbridge, 1996).
It is clear that companies operate in a complex
104 E. YOST AND R. CROES
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:0
5 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
web of relationships with a lot of different
stakeholders. This complex web, combined
with the characteristics described, create a
perfect managerial storm for increased risk of
fraud. According to the model, the managerial
factors are only exacerbated by the presence of
macroeconomic factors.
For the first time, this study offers publicly
traded restaurant companies with guidance
towards a more thorough understanding of the
specific conditions that might contribute to
fraudulent behavior and increased risk of fraud.
In addition, the identified conditions could
help managers to improve internal control
when a high risk factor is realized. The
contribution of this study may allow restaurant
companies to deter activities that may result in
increased risk of fraud.
LIMITATIONS
First, it is important to recognize that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was put in place to
regulate publicly traded companies only.
Therefore, for purposes of this study, privately
traded companies are excluded. This is a
limitation of the study because the results may
indicate a problem that is more or less
pervasive since the sample is representative of
a small number of companies in the United
States. For example, because private compa-
nies are not subject to the Act, their
governance procedures may be lacking com-
pletely, providing evidence of fraud that is not
regulated. In addition, the model is limited in
application because it does not take into
account fluctuations among the variables over
time. Although the model compares data
points to industry medians over time, the
model is static in that it reports data at specific
points in time but it does not calculate or
account for the differences in the amounts
between time periods. This could create a
situation in which the changes in the variables
are actually a result of the variables impacting
each other instead of changing independently
over time. Lagging the variables helps to
remove these effects but the variables may
still be exogenous when faced with changing
financial conditions over time. Future research
may address the changes in the variables over
time and may therefore provide additional
insight. Last, it should be noted that reported
internal control deficiencies are indicative of
increased fraud risk, but not necessarily
conclusive that fraud has occurred. Therefore,
just because a company has reported a
deficiency, it does not indicate fraud, necess-
arily. The study therefore precludes the ability
to conclude that fraud is always a result of an
internal control deficiency.
Future Research
Because the study revealed that the
macroeconomic conditions were significant
for the entire population of restaurant compa-
nies, an area of future research might explore
the relevance of the co alignment model (Olsen
& Roper, 1998) to strategic management
decisions to reduce the risk of fraud. The co
alignment model has typically been utilized
to make strategic management decisions for
improving performance, based on the elements
of environmental events, strategic choice, firm
structure and firm performance (Olsen, West &
Tse, 1998). By applying the coalignment model
to the identified variables, a new application for
management to reduce instances of fraud might
be revealed.
Although the evaluation of the entire
population of restaurant companies did not
provide significant results at the company level,
an opportunity became apparent to further
segregate the restaurant companies by restau-
rant segment to evaluate the effect of the
variables within a smaller, similar group.
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